Texto en Español
Roger Boisjoly on the Challenger Disaster
II. Early Evidence of a Temperature Effect
Question:
The bench tests showed that temperature can adversely affect the resiliency, and therefore the effectiveness, of the O-rings, yet management at Thiokol and NASA shows no interest in planning a design change. What general courses of action are reasonable for an engineer in this sort of situation?
Answer: Contact a professional society.
It depends on the society and the services that they offer members. If the society has an advice service this may be a good idea, but you have not taken the problem far enough within your company to warrant asking them to mediate for you with the Morton Thiokol management.
Further actions to possibly take:
Supporting Materials to Aid Decision Making
- Morton Thiokol and the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster
- Essay by Roger Boisjoly. A background summary of important events leading to the Challenger disaster starting with January, 1985, plus the specifics of the telecon meeting held the night prior to the launch at which an attempt was made to stop the launch by the Morton Thiokol engineers. In the essay he argues that the off-line telecon caucus by Morton Thiokol Management constituted the unethical decision-making forum which ultimately produced the management decision to launch Challenger without any restrictions.
- 7/31/85 Memo about O-Ring Erosion
- 8/22/85 Memo from A.R. Thompson on the Flight Seal
- What Went Wrong With the Solid Rocket Booster
- Morton Thiokol Wasatch Division Corporate Structure
- Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
- Representation and Misrepresentation: Tufte and the Morton Thiokol Engineers on the Challenger