Texto en Español
Roger Boisjoly on the Challenger Disaster
IV. Frustration with Lack of Management Support
After my presentation, I asked for help in the form of design improvement suggestions, but no one said a word. Bob Ebeling and I spent the remainder of the convention time meeting with seal vendors whom we had previously contacted for help. From the beginning, the Seal Task Team was frustrated from a lack of management support to provide the resources necessary for us to accomplish our task.
Discussion Questions
Morton Thiokol doesn't want to appear like a company with a flawed product, so they would prefer that Boisjoly play down the O-ring problem. While there have been a few cases of hot gas blow-by, almost twenty flights have flown successfully. Boisjoly has already written memos expressing his view of the seriousness of the joint problem. What can he do now?
Supporting Materials to Aid Decision Making
- Morton Thiokol and the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster
- Essay by Roger Boisjoly. A background summary of important events leading to the Challenger disaster starting with January, 1985, plus the specifics of the telecon meeting held the night prior to the launch at which an attempt was made to stop the launch by the Morton Thiokol engineers. In the essay he argues that the off-line telecon caucus by Morton Thiokol Management constituted the unethical decision-making forum which ultimately produced the management decision to launch Challenger without any restrictions.
- 7/31/85 Memo about O-Ring Erosion
- 8/22/85 Memo from A.R. Thompson on the Flight Seal
- What Went Wrong With the Solid Rocket Booster
- Morton Thiokol Wasatch Division Corporate Structure
- Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
- Representation and Misrepresentation: Tufte and the Morton Thiokol Engineers on the Challenger